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Abstract
My objective of this paper is to suggest and workout a more credible form of the 
Principle of Beneficence from the common essential elements of the three major 
ethical theories (Deontology, Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics) that will try to over-
come the over-demanding objection of Utilitarianism and the rigorism of Kant’s 
Deontology. After analyzing these three moral systems, I find that beneficence lies 
within the very essence of humanity. Human beings are superior to other creatures 
in the world due to rationality and humanity. From the humanitarian ground, a com-
mon goodness lies within every human. Beneficence, as a moral principle, is derived 
from this inner humanity of every individual. Despite their initial differences, util-
itarianism, deontology and virtue ethics recognize this fundamental humanitarian 
disposition of doing good for all as a part of being a morally better person. The 
principle of beneficence as I suggest, is different from its consequential utilitarian 
notion suggested by Mill. This version of beneficence is more credible as it does not 
impose excessive demands upon an individual to develop any maximum beneficial 
outcome following utilitarian calculation of beneficence over cost, and it also strives 
to overcome the rigorous duty-based theory of Kantian deontology by appealing to 
the fundamental virtue of humanity. Finally, the credibility of this form of benefi-
cence comes from the underlying transcendental humanism which is the chief fea-
ture of Indian tradition.
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Introduction
Moral philosophy is an inquiry of the rules, principles and virtues that guide 
every human action and behavior. Among them, the Principle of Beneficence is 
an established one. The word Beneficence is derived from its Latin origin ‘bene’ 
which means well or good and ‘facere’ means to make; while benevolence is 
coined from ‘bene’ and ‘volens’ which implies a will or disposition. In the field of 
morality, beneficence carries normative importance which refers to do an action 
to benefit others, whereas, benevolence is regarded as a virtue or good character 
trait of being disposed to act to benefit others.
Beneficence: The Fundamental Principle of Morality
Being a social person, a human being cannot always be considered as being con-
fined within one’s own self, since an individual is situated within a complex web 
of social relationships (MacIver & Page, 1949). Society and individuals are inter-
linked with one another, and being a social person, one has to interact with other 
people. Ethics guides us the morally right way of these social interactions. A per-
son can be regarded as social and morally better human when he not only inter-
acts with other people in right manner, but when he is disposed to do good for 
others beyond his own self. Hence, ethics is necessarily other-regarding. Benefi-
cence as a moral principle refers the normative significance of doing good for all. 
The study of ethics transcends individuals from their own selves toward others, 
and toward for the good of all. In this paper, I will argue that the principle of 
beneficence is the fundamental principle of ethics since it is intrinsically con-
nected with the very essence of morality.
Beneficence is The Concept of Well‑being for all: Individual and Community
The moral worth of beneficence provides us the concept of morally good life. 
However, we cannot avoid individual good since individual good is always related 
with the community good. From the history of moral philosophy, we can find 
the views of Aristotle (1925), and the views of eighteenth century philosophers 
such as Cumberland (1672), Butler (1869) and Hutcheson (1725) who redefine 
the concept of self-love or self-beneficence as the moral perfection of a being that 
unites self-beneficence with the beneficence toward other-beings and thus bridges 
the gap between these two.
Aristotle explains his notion of beneficence from self-love. For him, self-love 
does not necessarily imply self-centeredness. A person who is guided by the 
rational part of his soul, despite his concern about his own self, acts justly. Aris-
totle regards that person as the true lover of self. According to Aristotle, such a 
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lover of self is always guided by reason and always disposed to virtuous deeds. 
By doing noble acts, the person improves himself toward a morally better person.
According to Cumberland, while promoting the common good individuals will 
inevitably increase their own good. For him, the individual possesses a selfless natu-
ral inclination to pursue the common good, and this inclination to do the common 
good for all is a virtue named benevolence.
Butler finds human nature is naturally disposed to benevolence for his fellow-
beings, and there is no such confrontation between self-love and community love as 
he views human being as a whole with equal importance and proper balance of self-
love and social-love. For him, self-love which is guided with reason and conscience 
leads to the pursuit of general happiness with the proper accordance of conscience 
and reasonable benevolence and reasonable self-love.
Hutcheson also believes that human nature is naturally disposed to benevolence 
for fellow-beings. For him, self-love is undeniable for the motivation of actions, but 
it should produce moral goodness. He explains this view with his notion of moral 
sense which is capable of approving or disapproving moral virtues and vices.
On the contrary, Hobbes (1651) promoted psychological egoism by claiming that 
the absolute basic principle for human nature is nothing but self-interest. All humans 
always act from self-interest. The ultimate goal of every human action is to promote 
self-pleasure. Following this theory, any action which promotes the common good is 
deep down motivated from egoistic desire, i.e., the action which promotes the com-
mon good is only the means of self-beneficence.
Similar to the psychological egoist Hobbes, Bentham (1781) also believes that 
conflicts may occur between self-interest and collective interest. Bentham introduces 
four external sanctions (religious, natural, social and legislative) to control over our 
own private good and promote public good which leads to universal utility. The 
basic principle of his ethics is to produce maximum goods, and maximum goods can 
be produced only when we can harmonize the psychological claim of our private 
good with the public good.
Later, Mill (1863) introduces the internal sanction of conscience based on the 
humanitarian ground of individuals which seeks good for others. By the term ‘util-
ity’, Mill introduces the notion of happiness that involves not only for one individ-
ual’s satisfaction, but for universal happiness. Beneficence has rarely occupied such 
a key role in a moral theory like Utilitarianism. Mill believes in the immense poten-
tiality of sympathy and benevolent impulses in every human being which prompts 
the noble desire to promote utility, i.e., universal happiness. However, this potential 
human impulse for doing the noble things is very sensitive like tender plant which 
may be easily destroyed. Humans lose this high aspiration not only due to lack of 
time and opportunity, but because of ‘the majority of young persons… the society 
into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that higher capacity in 
exercise’ (Mill, 1863: 13). This inner benevolent impulse of human nature can be 
fostered and protected by education just as we need to grow the tender plant with 
lots of care and protection.
As consequentialists, Mill and his followers hold that an action is morally right, 
if an action, compared to many others, brings the greatest possible balance of ben-
eficial outcome. Conversely, if an action, compared to many others brings the least 
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possible beneficial consequence, that action is not morally right, and it must be 
avoided. So, the basic concern is to achieve the ideal goal of greatest possible ben-
eficial consequences for the greatest number. However, the all-inclusive ideal con-
sequentialist demand often puts individuals into such obligations which often go 
beyond their capacities. The need for beneficence in Utilitarianism becomes over-
demanding in two senses (Fishkin, 1982). First, Utilitarianism may require too much 
for an individual in maximizing the good for others even by imposing harm on inno-
cent individual which harm is morally unacceptable. For example, people should 
take isolation and quarantine methods to protect themselves and others from coro-
navirus which will promote overall good. However, it is not morally justified to kill 
the virus infected victims to maximize the overall good. Second, this theory pushes 
individual for maximal contribution for promoting the overall good. The cost, the 
contribution, the sacrifice, no matter how costly it is for the individual, will not even 
be counted, provided it is outweighed by the benefit of others. Suppose a wealthy 
benevolent individual wants to help the health department by donating some money 
for arranging the kits and medications in this outbreak of COVID-19. Now, the 
heavy demand of the situation requires if the wealthy people of each province make 
some charity in the health care departments, the beneficial outcome overcomes the 
cost. Unfortunately, in his locality no one else is ready for this charity. In this situ-
ation, it will be morally unjustified if we demand more, following utilitarianism, 
from the willing person to balance the cost–benefit analysis. Moreover, even if the 
person sacrifices his every single possession his huge selfless sacrifice will not be 
appreciated if it will not overcome the cost of the situation. The whole problem of 
over-demandingness following Utilitarianism emerges due to its sole consequential-
ist approach to morality. Here the rightness and wrongness of every action depend 
solely on its maximum beneficial consequences which completely ignores the inten-
tion or motive of the agent.
On the contrary of Mill’s Utilitarianism, a different normative position is held by 
Deontologist Kant (1975) who distinguishes between any kind of inclination and 
the concept of duty. He regards benevolence as a duty that is distinct from any kind 
of natural inclination. For him, the duty should be universal. Since emotional incli-
nations are uncertain and contingent, it cannot be the motive of duty. He does not 
regard such charity works as a duty where people help others not from their sense 
of duty but due to some other motives. For him, there is a possibility of self-inter-
est or self-inclination as the motivation behind such works. He distinguishes duty 
from one’s own selfish interest and inclinations. According to Kant, the person holds 
moral worth who feels no philanthropic inclination, but who nonetheless works to 
help others because he knows that it is his responsibility to do. The sole determinant 
of an activity of being moral depends on whether the action is done from purely 
duty’s sake or not. He moves further by accepting that his duty of benevolence 
derives from the virtue of love (Kant, 1964). Such love is pure practical love which 
is derived from wisdom and distinct from any pathological emotions. He adds that 
emotional love may fade away or may even disappear with the unpredictability of 
the situations. However, the limitation of this Kantian notion lies in its rigorous view 
on duty-based morality. According to Kant, only those actions hold moral worth 
which follow consciously the universal moral law of duty. However, in daily life, we 
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are often confronted with some moral dilemmas where it is not possible to act uni-
versally with the moral law of duty. For example, telling truth is a universal moral 
command of law. However, if telling truth can harm another’s life then we find our-
selves within moral dilemmas. When the moral command of telling truth confronts 
with another moral command of duty which prohibits one to harm the other individ-
ual, it is morally required to choose the other one than telling truth. So, in real life it 
is not possible to act universally according to the command of moral law. Moreover, 
Kantian morality excludes all emotions including the altruistic ones from the notion 
of benevolence. Nonetheless, benevolence-in-itself includes the concept of love, 
sympathy and compassion. The duty of doing good to others presupposes the agent’s 
concern, sympathy and love toward others.
Furthermore, Smith (1976) also holds the middle position as he rejects any such 
extremist position of egoism and pure altruism in his theory. He regards self-interest 
and other-interest as the two different instances of sympathy. The only difference 
between the two lies in the degree of familiarity as a person is more familiar with 
his own sensation than the reflective sensation of others. Smith’s notion promotes 
beneficent acts without rejecting self-interest as vice, rather he considers it as virtue.
Finally, according to Habermas (1973), human self is not a distinct disinterested 
entity or unencumbered by nature, but the constitution and evolution of self-identity 
develops essentially from an inter-subjective communication with others. Benhabib 
(1992) is also inspired by Habermas’s moral doctrine and accepts this inter-subjec-
tive concept of self. An individual self can be understood as a related entity among 
others in a community through the inter-subjective communication of speech and 
action between individual self with others. This standpoint differs from Kantian and 
Rawlsian autonomy (Rawls, 1972) where individual self is viewed as both as auton-
omous and as unencumbered under the ‘veil of ignorance.’ For Habermas, the evo-
lution of the moral judgments of justice is intimately related with the self-other rela-
tions through which one’s self-identity is constituted (Habermas, 1979). However, 
this is a strong formalist claim of justice-oriented theory which Benhabib rejects. 
In contrast to Habermas, Benhabib accepts that, ‘the fairness of moral norms and 
the integrity of moral values can only be established via process of practical argu-
mentation which allows participants full equality and in initiating and continuing 
the debate and suggesting new subject matters for conversation.’ (Benhabib, 1992: 
73) Benhabib regards this form of moral communication as the basic insight of her 
communicative ethics. Through this basic insight Benhabib establishes communi-
cative ethics as moral justification where the moral justification comes from moral 
argumentation. Communicative ethics is a procedural moral theory where individu-
als have their freedom to share their morally justified perspectives but not like the 
unencumbered self within an ‘original position’ among predefined set of issues and 
legislation of Rawls. Communicative ethics encourages a more modern understand-
ing of the self which not only provides the right to challenge political, religious or 
social dogmas but also endorses the right to distance oneself from the social role 
and content which Benhabib calls ‘reflexive role-distance’ (Benhabib, 1992: 73). 
Therefore, there is no chance of imposition or domination of others’ prima facie 
rules, duties and obligations over one’s views and understanding since every human 
self should always be treated like a non-instrumental entity. Benhabib develops her 
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communicative ethics by viewing individual self as a related entity who has the abil-
ity and willingness of reflexive role-distance-attributed with ability and willingness 
to adopt others’ justified rational viewpoint through an inter-subjective paradigmatic 
communication. An individual self is regarded here as always undergoing a psychic-
moral formation, and this modern understanding of individual self “make[s] it moti-
vationally plausible as well as rationally acceptable for them to adopt the reflexivity 
and universalism of communicative ethics.” (Benhabib, 1992: 74).
In this framework, our moral experiences enrich and diverge through various 
historical and cultural struggles. So, it is illegitimate and unjustified to restrict our 
moral domain and experience strictly by centering justice as the core of moral life 
and by strictly connecting this virtue with the concept of good life. However, com-
municative ethics does not accept strong deontology but establishes moral argumen-
tation of norms as the central criteria for their validity. Such theory does not restrict 
the notion of good life by accepting inter-connectedness with justice. This theory 
allows moral debate regarding our different notions of good lives and make them 
accessible through moral reflection and transformation. Hence, it provides a modern 
understanding without any prejudice since the overarching notion of good life varies 
through time, situation and experiences. The modern understanding of communica-
tive ethics endorses unity of reasons among various value differentiations regardless 
of plurality of goodness or loss of certainty through inter-subjective communication. 
For example, a modern life lives with the varieties of goodness. The good life can 
be realized by the life of a brave soldier who fights to protect his nation or a social 
activist who stands for anti-war peaceful movement. However, the ethics or values 
cannot be prejudged since the notion of good life varies through time, situation and 
experiences. The variety of good life cannot be judged with any general intuitive 
prima facie values or norms but rather the morally good decision can be realized 
through the modern perspective of inter-subjective communication.
Like Benhabib’s theory of justice, beneficence can also be regarded as the sum 
of the other-regarding virtues par excellence. The goodness of these virtues binds us 
in a non-relative manner. Differences may occur due to our cross-cultural perspec-
tives, but the goodness of these virtues remains universal. For example, despite the 
differences between Mill’s Utilitarianism and Kant’s deontology on the notion of 
beneficence, both agree that goodness of beneficence inheres in the value of promot-
ing good for all. Another illustration can be made on the social equality which is a 
universal virtue. Marx and Gandhiji both aim for an equal classless society. Now 
Marx supports class struggle to change the social structure of the society. On the 
contrary, Gandhiji endorses non-violence method which appeals to the inner good-
ness of humanity. Despite of their different perspectives which evolve from their 
own situations, time, cultures and experiences, the goodness of the virtue of equal-
ity for all human beings remains same in both cases. Benhabib prescribes for inter-
paradigmatic dialog through which we can minimize these differences. However, 
these external differences do not affect the universally acceptable goodness of the 
virtues, but it can be reflexive through communication where we will acknowledge 
others’ points of view with proper respect and will come to a point of agreement 
where there is a justification of others’ positions. We can illustrate this point with an 
example. Suppose a person is in the middle of a situation where he finds a stranger 
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and his loved ones in an equally emergency situation and on that moment, he can 
only rescue one among them where there is no other rescuer around. This example 
is quite similar with the illustration of Bernard Williams (1981) where a person is 
stuck between his mildly injured wife and severely injured stranger, however, we 
can still assume that with a sympathetic gesture toward his wife the person should 
rescue the severely injured stranger. Here, sympathetic gesture toward his wife is as 
important as rescuing the stranger. However, the situation is more difficult where 
both of them are equally in emergency situation and due to lack of time the person 
can only save one. We can find two different solutions in this situation. Firstly, we all 
owe a responsibility and liability toward our family members and close ones; usu-
ally an individual chooses spontaneously his duty toward the one for whom he feels 
direct love and care. Secondly, from the impartial point of view, we cannot prioritize 
between these two people only because one of them is known to me. In the sec-
ond position, the individual’s ‘self is viewed from nowhere’ (Nagel, 1970) or under 
the ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1972). According to Nagel’s impartial standpoint, 
since humans are rational being, they have rational requirements for their actions as 
well as they have rational requirements for their desires. The reason behind rational 
actions requiring practical judgment is formulated from an impersonal standpoint, 
i.e., ‘provides a view of the world without giving one’s location in it’ (Nagel, 1970: 
101). And following Rawls, initially each human being should be treated equally 
irrespective of one’s class, caste, race, gender. This original position of every human 
self is viewed under the ‘veil of ignorance’ that is without any prior knowledge of 
their background. Benhabib in her communicative ethics says that in this situation 
we can minimize the differences by moral argumentation or communication between 
these two opposing views since this is the proper rational and non-instrumental way 
to respect others’ views. For her, we can minimize the differences and can come to 
an agreement by respecting each other’s view of justification through inter-paradig-
matic dialogs. Again, there is no concept of domination or imposition of one’s view 
among others as through this we will treat others and their views instrumentally, 
however, human self is a non-instrumental self. If, we do not achieve any consen-
sus through moral communication, we will maintain reflexive role-distance with 
our own standpoints but there is no concept of imposition or domination on oth-
ers’ views in communicative ethics. We should treat others’ view respectfully and 
beneficently. These differences occur due to different situations and various cultural 
perspectives which are interconnected to human self where these differences hold 
rational justification from their own perspectives, and everyone has the freedom of 
justifying their own position through inter-subjective paradigmatic dialog. Finally, 
as these external differences can never affect the core goodness of virtues, the good-
ness is established as reflexive but non-relative.
Following Benhabib, we can add that, despite the external differences between 
different ethical theories, the common element is that none can deny the normative 
importance of beneficence in moral studies. According to deontology, it is our duty 
to promote good for others. Like utilitarianism, other teleological theories always 
focus upon the telos or the consequences to maximize good or well-being for others. 
Being different from these two principle-based theories, virtue ethics emphasizes on 
building the benevolent character of the moral agent. As social beings, we should 
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develop such social virtues of benevolence, cooperation, friendship, justice. The 
common element among these three systems is the notion of promoting good for all 
either based on rules or by developing virtue. The external differences among these 
three different theories will not affect the core goodness of the virtue of beneficence. 
Hence, by combining these three theories, we can say that being a rational and social 
human, we should value the normative importance of the core virtue of beneficence.
Toward A More Credible Form of Beneficence: Appeals to the Core 
of Humanity
After all this discussion, my objective is to suggest and workout a more credible 
form of the Principle of Beneficence. Following Benhabib, I emphasize the common 
essential virtue of these three ethical theories and will develop a more credible form 
of beneficence that will overcome both the excessive demand of Utilitarianism and 
the limitation of Kant’s Deontology which excluded emotions as part of our natural 
ethical responses to others. Through the discussion, in the paper so far, I found that 
beneficence lies within the very essence of humanity. There is a common goodness 
which lies in every human being. Beneficence, as a moral principle is derived from 
this inner humanity of every individual. In other words, human dignity and its very 
essence are defined by the principle of beneficence. Despite their initial differences, 
utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics recognize this fundamental humanitar-
ian disposition of doing good for others. Mill recognizes this as the natural human 
benevolent disposition of mind which is like a tender plant that needs proper care 
and protection through realization to grow further. The principle of beneficence as 
I suggest, is different from its consequential utilitarian notion as suggested by Mill 
since it develops from the basic understanding of humanity. No ethical system can 
deny this common and deepest part of morality. This version of beneficence is more 
credible as it does not impose over-demandingness on an individual for any maxi-
mum beneficial outcome following utilitarian calculation of beneficence over cost, 
and it also overcomes the rigorous duty-based limitation of Kantian deontology. 
This version appeals to the fundamental virtue of humanity. Finally, the credibil-
ity of this form of beneficence can be supported by the underlying transcendental 
humanism which is the chief feature of Indian tradition.
In this regard, I find Nicolai Hartmann’s view on moral ought to be very sig-
nificant. Nicolai Hartmann (1932) identifies the rigorism of Kantian notion of ought 
evolves from its universal emphasis on the moral worth on the character of moral 
ought. In Kantian ethics, the meaning of the moral laws comes from its universalis-
tic nature of moral ought. Kantian theory endorses that the moral law is the univer-
sal commandment, imperative or claim upon an individual’s moral character. The 
rigorism of Kantian theory evolves from its universal claim of moral worth for any 
action, i.e., the moral action should be performed for the sake of the moral law. Fol-
lowing this, an action is moral if and only if it is performed in accordance with the 
law. However, to be moral, it is not enough to be only in accordance with the law 
but it also requires one’s intention to be directed toward moral values as an end. 
Hartmann identifies Kant’s rigorism since Kantian theory confines moral worth 
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within the universality of moral law. Hartmann applies ought to values and rede-
fines the idea of morality where one’s will would have to be directed toward moral 
values as an end. Hartmann argues that his theory will not be directly and solely 
concerned with the universality of moral ought, but it also focuses ‘the moral values 
[which] constitute the supreme end of moral actions’ (Hartmann, 1932: 30). Unlike 
Kant, Hartmann endorses that the moral worth of any actions depends on the valu-
ational qualities they produce. According to Hartmann, a morally good person can 
distinguish himself as how he morally ought to be from the moral valuations of his 
actions. To overcome the rigorism of Kant’s theory, Hartmann relocates the focus 
of the moral worth from the universality of moral law and applies the moral worth 
to moral values or goods of the actions and relates it with the agent. Precisely, Hart-
mann combines the moral ought with an individual’s value or inner character traits. 
He writes,
[a]n act is of course morally valuable through its end, but not in so far as the 
content of the end is the moral worth of the act, and not simply in so far as 
it has goods in its content, but in so far as its content is a definite relation of 
goods to person (Hartmann, 1932: 31).
The end of a particular action has its situational value, however its moral qual-
ity is actional and has its personal value since the moral quality is related with the 
moral character of the agent, and it evolves from the agent’s continuous striving to 
achieve its value, but not in its final end.
In this regard, he classifies three notions of ought: “ought in general”, “ought 
to be” and “ought to do.” Moral “ought in general” is similar to the Kantian 
notion of a moral imperative as it comes as a command to individual. Hartmann 
defines “ought to be” as “a quality of moral acts in which the reality of other 
values is involved, this means that this valuational intention of the acts should 
be so constituted, or the contents so selected, that the moral qualities inhere in 
the acts” (Hartmann, 1932: 33). This implies that ‘ought to be’ will be some-
thing actual. He argues that if the intended ought is not in accordance with the 
requirement, ‘the act will necessarily not be as it ought to be (Hartmann, 1932: 
33). For example, if one helps others only out of duty but not from the intention 
to be benevolent or compassionate to other-beings, then the person’s act will not 
hold its moral worth. Since, this action does not conform the requirement of what 
it ought to be so in general, this action is definitely not what it ought to be in 
actual. So, ‘ought to be so in general’ is actual, and it does not only mean what on 
one ought to strive to be so. Ought to do demands and directs one to aim for the 
realization of unfulfilled value in the act itself. However, Hartman identifies that 
limits of the ought lie in here as here ‘arises a contradiction to the law that the 
moral worth of a deed cannot at the same time be the value aimed at as the end in 
view’ (Hartmann, 1932: 33). Suppose a person is intended to be ideally benevo-
lent, and so he devotes himself into charity work, however, as a finite being, he 
has some materialistic limitation as well as the limitation of time and special dis-
tance. So, the ideal value for which he aims for does not accord with the value of 
his performing deeds. Accordingly, ought to do not always attaches to the ideal 
moral values, but it attaches to situational values. Nevertheless, this limitation of 
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ought to do is not the limitation of ought in general as “[t]he imperative character 
therefore of moral commandments, which are concerned with conduct as such, 
is not affected by this limit” (Hartmann, 1932: 33). Hartmann prescribes that the 
limitation of the actual act can be overcome by the individual’s rational striving 
for attaining the ideal value and also clarifies that moral values are not dependent 
upon achieving such ideal value, but it lies in the striving itself. So, the person 
who aims to be ideally benevolent, the moral worth of his beneficent actions does 
not depend on achieving the moral value, but its moral worth arises from his con-
tinuous rational endeavor-in-itself.
Following the distinctions of Hartmann’s moral ought, I differentiate the principle 
of beneficence in two ways. Firstly, beneficence as a moral principle or ideal moral 
ought that is universal and grounded in the very nature of humanity. This ought in 
general is actual since its intention ought to be based in the humanitarian concern 
toward others. If any beneficent action is not intended from one’s humanitarian con-
cern toward others, then that action will not be what it ought to be so in general. 
Secondly, beneficence as an active principle is situation-specific for its successful 
application in our daily lives. The principle of beneficence as an active principle can 
be applied successfully in practice where there is a harmony between the humanitar-
ian intention of doing good and the actual situation. For example, when I would see 
a drowning child, the universal moral imperative of beneficence would direct me to 
do something good by which I can save the child, but not only from duty’s sake but 
also from the humanitarian concern toward the child. But I can only perform it in 
actuality if my intention of doing good is in accordance with my actual situation. 
Here the actual situation primarily requires my swimming ability. Without this abil-
ity, I cannot actualize the principle of beneficence in this situation.
However, the ideal moral imperative of beneficence never stops a human being 
from his continuous striving for doing good to others. Following this universal 
moral imperative of beneficence, one despite one’s own swimming incapability can 
run to others for help to save the child by informing the local police or localities 
to save the child’s life. However, following the high demand for ideal beneficence, 
some situations become more complicated where the individual is capable of swim-
ming but there are more than one or two or ten drowning children and equally in the 
same emergency. Then, the ideal goal of beneficence demands to save all which is 
beyond one single person’s capability. Thus, beneficence as an active principle has 
its limitation in the situation-specific context where the demand for moral worth fol-
lowing the ideal imperative is too high.
Conversely, since the universal moral worth of beneficence requires us to ful-
fill the unfulfilled ideal moral goal and directs individuals to fulfill the ideal goal, 
this situation-specific limitation is not applicable to the universal moral principle of 
beneficence. The limitation of the actualization of the ideal moral act of beneficence 
in this situation can be overcome through a continuous endeavor toward achiev-
ing the ideal value of beneficence. The quality of a moral act does not depend on 
achieving the ideal goal, but the moral worth inheres within the genuine continuous 
endeavor of achieving that ideal value of the action itself. In the above situation, the 
person can sincerely endeavor to save as many children as he can without harming 
himself since it will not be wise to put himself in danger in this already endangered 
1 3
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 
situation and since simultaneously he can inform the locality and police to try to 
save them all.
The moral principle of beneficence comes as a universal obligation from our core 
of humanity. The sincere endeavor for this conscientious effort of doing good holds 
the goodness and genuineness of an individual’s intention. This conscientious effort 
is intrinsically valuable. The content of the intention of this endeavor should be uni-
versal and objective regardless of its situational perspective. Here the moral worth 
lies within this universal content of continuous striving to achieve the ideal value. 
This continuous effort to reach the ideal value is unconditional and good-in-itself. 
I suggest that, despite the limitation and incapability of an individual to act benefi-
cently for all in a particular situation, the continuous effort for the ideal value of 
beneficence for any situation determines the moral worth of any action. Morality 
aims to develop an individual into a morally better person, and this conscientious 
effort within every individual develops the moral conduct of an individual. Thus, 
this version of beneficence can overcome the Kantian duty-based limitation of actu-
alization, yet maintaining the universalization of moral value, by conjoining it with 
agent’s moral value. Kantian duty-based theory has the limitation of actualization 
since here morality claims that every action should be followed by the universality 
of duty for duty’s sake only and the moral worth of Kantian theory only focuses on 
this universality of duty for any action. My version of beneficence, following Hart-
mann, relocates the focus of the moral worth from the universality of moral duty-
based beneficent actions to moral values of beneficence of the actions and relates 
it with the agent and combines the moral ought with an individual’s value or inner 
character traits.
In this regard, I would also like to mention the Aristotelian concept of the mean 
which refers every virtue of character lies between two correlative faults or vices. 
Consequently, virtue represents neither excess nor deficiency but the right amount. 
He develops his doctrine of mean with the concept of arete or virtue per excellence. 
According to him, ‘excellence makes what has it good, and enables it to perform its 
function well’ (Aristotle, 1925: 1106a16–25, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II). Virtue 
is by nature intermediate between two extremes and it is same for all, but intermedi-
ate is not in the object but relatively to us or to be chosen by us. Aristotle illustrates 
this point such as if ten is too extreme and two is too little, then the intermediate is 
six in terms of the object according to arithmetical proposition. However, if both the 
athletic trainer and beginner order six pounds food for each, it will be too much for 
the beginner and too less for trainer. So, the intermediate is not in the object, but it 
should be chosen by us which is relative to us. The person with practical wisdom 
who has the proper understanding of virtue can efficiently choose the right interme-
diate of virtue for one’s own self. Now, following Aristotle, this version of benefi-
cence confirms the excellence of human being is the disposition of beneficence 
which derives from the common goodness of every human being and enables a 
human to perform well for the betterment of humanity in general. Human excellence 
consists in something which makes it unique and exclusive to only humans. Aristotle 
recognizes this uniqueness of human beings consists in reason or practical wisdom 
which can determine the observance of the mean of virtues relative to us. This ver-
sion of beneficence also requires such practical wisdom to determine the harmony 
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between one’s humanitarian intention of doing good and the actual situation which 
is relative to one’s own time, place, culture, experience and ability. Practical wis-
dom, of this theory, is not only the reason but the proper balance of reason and 
emotion since the moral value of beneficence presupposes the altruistic emotional 
concern such as sympathy, compassion, love for other-beings. Here, the proper bal-
ance refers the intermediate between two extremes of both reason and emotion, and 
it is relative to individual’s capability and specific situation. Moreover, this theory 
not only recognizes rationality as the uniqueness of human being, but it also recog-
nizes the inner goodness of humanity as the exclusiveness of human beings. Here, 
by the term ‘rationality’ I intended to mean the human ability of reasonable and 
balanced thinking, judging and acting that other animals lack. Practical wisdom, as 
I mentioned above, follows from such reasonable and balanced thought process of 
rationality. Moreover, following Aristotle’s concept of mean, the goodness of any 
action lies in performing that action well and all the goodness is directed to achieve 
the ultimate state of contentment or fulfillment, called eudaimonia. The ultimate 
goal of every human being, following Aristotle’s ethics, is to achieve that supreme 
excellence state of serenity or permanent state of happiness and every human action, 
and its goodness depends on that ultimate goal of eudaimonia. In eudaimonist virtue 
ethics, the virtue is only justified because of the consequences it brings about. Here 
the virtues are the constitutive elements of achieving the ideal state of eudaimonia. 
Following Aristotle, my theory also focuses on the continuous endeavor toward the 
betterment. In my theory as I have mentioned above, I differentiate between benefi-
cence in general which comes as an ought and beneficence in actuality which has 
specific limitation based on one’s capability and situation. People are aiming for the 
betterment, however the moral worth of my theory does not depend or determined 
by the consequences on how much the agent comes closest to perfection through his 
performance. The moral worth of my theory solely focuses on one’s pure motive or 
genuine endeavor but not on any measurement or consequences it brings about.
Moreover, unlike utilitarianism, my version of beneficence does not impose any 
unfair obligation on an individual to fulfill the maximum beneficial outcome. The 
limitation to actualize beneficence in  situation-specific context can be overcome 
by the continuous endeavor of an individual to achieve that ideal universal value 
of beneficence for any situation. This continuous effort bridges the gap between the 
ideal moral value of beneficence with its actualization in the real world. Only those 
beneficent actions hold the moral worth where the volition of continuous effort 
underlies the effort to achieve the value of ideal beneficence. Such continuous effort 
to be ideally beneficent develops the moral conduct of any individual. I have argued 
that every human being based on their humanity holds a moral responsibility to be 
beneficent toward other human. Thus, the universal moral principle of beneficence 
derives as a primary moral ought from the most fundamental value of humanity. 
The rational willingness to be morally responsible for others originates from the 
basic humanitarian concern for other human beings. Human beings are born with 
this beneficent disposition. However, this disposition is vulnerable within the world 
where we have to survive. Human beings become self-centered due to the continu-
ous struggle they have to undergo to survive in this competitive world. During this 
continuous struggle, humans gradually become self-centered and forget their basic 
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essence of humanity. The primary duty of ethics is to protect and enhance this basic 
humanitarian disposition of beneficence. The humanitarian concern for other-beings 
springs deep inside from the love for humanity in general which develops the moral 
disposition to be beneficent for all. Thus, this disposition to be beneficent is univer-
sally intrinsic to every human being.
The usual objection against beneficence is that it may tend to lead to injustice 
by overlooking minority persons’ rights in a society. However, this objection is 
attributed with the utilitarian standpoint of beneficence where the moral worth of 
an action depends solely on its maximum beneficial outcome. For a utilitarian, one 
should always emphasize on the maximum outcome of the collective social good 
where a minority’s claim is often overlooked in order to maintain the highest benefi-
cial outcome for the whole society. However, this objection cannot be raised against 
my suggested form of beneficence, since here no such moral demand is prescribed to 
maximize the beneficial outcome. This version of beneficence rather focuses on the 
inward growth of humanity and protects the natural humanitarian disposition of con-
cern for others. Human beings are now well-aware of their rational superiority over 
other species; however, they are not fully aware of their natural humanitarian dispo-
sition through which they naturally connect and cooperate with other human beings. 
Although whenever we are confronted with some accidental emergency, our inner 
goodness rises with the benevolent concern in our conscious mind, and it comes as 
a command to us to do something beneficent. Suppose I maintain punctuality in my 
office. However, when I see a person fall down from a bus on the way of my office, 
my inner goodness rises with concern for that person, and I run for help rather main-
taining my office punctuality. Again, whenever we are facing any collective crisis 
and there is any worldwide threat toward whole human race like the recent outbreak 
of coronavirus epidemic, our goodness rises the concern not only for our own selves 
but for the miserable conditions of the sufferers and for the dying patients all over 
the world. During this situation, our inner goodness of humanity commands us to 
take the preventative method of isolation and quarantine not only for others’ good 
but also one’s own good and for the overall good. Again, we should take the respon-
sibility to raise awareness among people who are not concerned of the fatality of 
this infection. We should increase our inner goodness and the overall concern for the 
humanity within us to defeat this collective crisis together.
However, this goodness gradually decreases when we do not respond to the call 
of our inner selves. We should respond to the command which comes from our very 
essence of humanity, otherwise, the superiority of human beings will be at stake 
since human beings are superior not only due to their rationality but also due to 
their humanity. My version of beneficence is not demanding that one should always 
have to do something good for others. This version demands that one should not 
ever ignore the moral command of beneficence which rises from our core goodness 
of humanity. Constant ignoring of the command will gradually decrease our core 
goodness of humanity, and we will end up like a sociopath who has ultimately lost 
the capacity of sensing the essence of humanity and finally recklessly hurt his own 
fellow-beings. The goodness of humanity always recognizes and appreciates the 
sense of something that is good and also the reverse of it. Based on the capability 
of sensing the goodness and its reverse, we can differentiate the good from the bad, 
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and the inner goodness of our humanity objects whenever we see any suppression of 
goodness of one fellow being by other fellow-beings. Our core goodness of human-
ity raises its voice against any kind of suppression such as that of men over women, 
white over black, rich over poor, master over slave, even the suppression by humans 
over nature. Our goodness of humanity raises the beneficent concern for the sup-
pressed ones and unites us all to protest and to endorse laws which can abolish such 
suppressions and injustice. Justice and law control such suppression externally but 
to abolish any kind of unfair suppression and injustice, we should nurture our inner 
goodness and always be conscious about our essence of humanity.
Following Benhabib, I suggest that, like justice, beneficence also equally raises 
concern for others. Justice deals with another person’s right, obligation and claim, 
while beneficence touches the inner human heart. Beneficence deals with one’s 
moral concern for others which springs from the deepest core of humanity. Justice 
works externally since it deals with external rules and regulations. Here I would like 
to add the famous quotation of a great Christian Protestant thinker, Reinhold Nie-
buhr, who once said, “Love is the motive, justice is the instrument” (1966). The 
command to be just or to maintain justice is regulated by two ways; one is by the 
external imposition of punishment and another one comes from the internal com-
pulsion of being a just human as well. On the other hand, beneficent disposition is 
beyond any such norms and regulations since it is natural, intrinsic and develops 
inwardly by touching another human’s heart through its purest form. This intrinsic 
disposition of beneficence comes as a moral ought which directs how one ought to 
act beneficently to others.
Nevertheless, justice is essentially required to protect everyone’s legitimate rights 
and to maintain peace and harmony within a community. Justice in its external form 
connects other-beings externally by its law and regulations, whereas the disposition 
of beneficence unites other-beings inwardly. Therefore, justice and beneficence are 
complementary to each other since justice works externally which binds the com-
munity, and beneficence grows inwardly which develops an individual to become 
a morally better individual and unites one with others. A morally better person 
obeys law and maintains justice from within who is morally disposed to do good 
for others. The continuous striving for ideal beneficence for humanity in general can 
never be unjust to anyone. Moreover, the concern for other-beings is a more sim-
ple and natural disposition since this beneficence disposition is always intrinsically 
connected within us from the very beginning. We just need to be conscious of its 
existence through responding its call and develop the proper balance of reason and 
emotion to respond it according to our own capabilities and situation, so that we 
can avoid between excessively beneficent and deficiently beneficent. This disposi-
tion transcends an individual’s own self-ego toward others and gets into the other 
human’s heart through its humanitarian appeal.
The natural disposition of beneficence is fundamentally universal, although 
it is initially directed for the close persons. The tender disposition of beneficence 
develops within the close circle with whom a child grows up, i.e., within one’s fam-
ily members, friends and loved ones where the communication is direct, and the 
closeness lies in the intimate level. This disposition in its ideal level commands 
us to be beneficent for all where deep inside every individual feels pure love for 
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the humanity. This is the ideal form of morality where the humanitarian value of 
beneficence transcends toward its ideal moral perfection. The continuous endeavor 
to develop the ideal value of beneficence from close ones to all is the fundamental 
universal imperative of morality, and it is a matter of cultivation to make it the con-
scious center from which all our actions flows.
The compulsion of this beneficence arises from one’s own deeply rooted humani-
tarian nature. Humans continuously strive to be morally beneficent from inside, 
and my version of beneficence believes in this inward reformation and appeals to 
its inner humanitarian root. I argue that the principle of beneficence is the funda-
mental principle of ethics. If we go deeper to analyse the source of this compul-
sion, we will realize how the compulsion of beneficence is related to the core of our 
humanity. Once we realize that the compulsion of beneficence comes to us from our 
very essence of humanity where our sole existence is related to one another, we will 
naturally develop our inner goodness of beneficence within us as the fundamental 
value of morality. When everyone realizes the sole root of humanity, there will be no 
hatred or violence among each other despite the apparent distinction of class, caste, 
sex and religion; rather love will be the prime motivator for every human action. 
This core bond of unity among diversity can be found in Indian tradition from the 
proper knowledge and realization of soul or atman from ancient Vedic scriptures 
and the sutras of Mahayana Buddhism to the modern Indian thoughts of Swami 
Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore, Gandhiji and Ambedkar who not only realize 
the true essence of humanity but also apply the principle of beneficence in reality by 
continuously working toward the social upliftment for the well-being of humanity in 
general. The detailed discussion is left for some other occasion.
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